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of the Congress in 1985-86 may simply suggest that the members of
Congress are devising new rules for "counting" majorities and
maintaining electoral support in the new fragmented politics.
Constitutional adaptation and flexibility-even informal
change-is above all a question of the will and inventiveness of individuals. It is, quite simply, a matter ofleadership. Men and women
make government work, and they make constitutions work, too. By
the same token, we are not apt to have much effective government
with a President who does not like government, whether effective or
not. Effective government in a democracy is at bottom a matter of
organizing mass popular support behind public policy. For better
or worse, American institutions of government are enormously responsive and sensitive to political opinion. That imperative transcends even the institutional arrangements of the Constitution.

GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE
CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES
OUR HISTORY. By Laurence H. Tribe.1 New York: Random House. 1985. Pp. xii, 171. $17.95.
Richard E. Morgan 2
Few would deny that Laurence H. Tribe is one of the most
sophisticated defenders of judicial activism writing today. This little book is intended to convince the general reader that Ronald
Reagan should not be allowed to place nominees of his choice on
the Supreme Court without careful Senate inquiry into their views
on contemporary constitutional issues. Fair enough. (Although
one wonders whether Professor Tribe would be urging such vigilance on the Senators if another administration were seeking doctrinal clones for Justice Brennan.) And Tribe develops an excellent
case for close senatorial scrutiny of the "constitutional visions" of
Supreme Court nominees.
He begins by debunking the idea-which has wormed its way
into the conventional wisdom of political scientists, historians, and
other students of the Court over the past several decades-that
Presidents cannot really do much to reshape the Supreme Court by
nominating persons with views similar to their own. As Tribe effectively demonstrates, this is, at best, a half-truth.
1.
2.

Professor of Law, Harvard University.
Professor of Government, Bowdoin College.
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Many of the famous examples of Justices surprising the President who nominated them, turn out, on closer examination, to be
examples of presidential inattention or yielding to short-term political considerations. If James Madison, for instance, was surprised
by Justice Story's commitment to Federalist principles, "he had
only himself to blame, for most of Madison's [Democratic Republican] party, including his mentor Thomas Jefferson, had warned him
not to nominate Story for just this reason." And Woodrow Wilson,
knowing James McReynolds's "conservative streak," wanted him
out of the Cabinet so much that he kicked him upstairs, where
McReynolds "spent twenty-six years voting against everything
Woodrow Wilson stood for, and compiling a record as perhaps the
most reactionary and certainly the most obnoxious man who ever
served on the Court."
To the list of errors by inattention out of expediency may be
added the two great Eisenhower blunders (Earl Warren and
William Brennan), and Gerald Ford's nomination of John Paul
Stevens. To restore the prestige of a Justice Department tained by
Watergate and the intelligence scandals, Ford sought out Edward
Levi, Dean of the University Chicago Law School and a man held
in the highest esteem by American's legal elite. Levi did, indeed,
help raise morale and return the Department and the FBI to respectability, but his politics were markedly left of Ford's. Even
though Justice Douglas's resignation could not have taken the
White House altogether by surprise, the President's men were intellectually unprepared. Under pressure for a noncontroversial, "consensus" nomination to advance their unelected President's themes
of "healing" and "bringing together," the White House deferred to
Levi (even though he was not one of them politically), and the Attorney General produced a distinguished Chicago practitioner and
former Wiley Rutledge clerk with virtually no public track record
on constitutional issues. That Stevens's performance must often
disappoint Gerald Ford and those who were his closest advisors is
nobody's fault but their own.
On the other side, Tribe marshals impressive examples of intellectually effective nominating strategies. Washington and Adams
managed to put in place a nationalist majority that survived three
decades into the nineteenth century. Jackson created a majority
that would champion state banks over the hated Second Bank of the
United States in Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky.3 Lincoln, having five
nominations to work with, was rewarded by a majority that accepted the legal theories on which his conduct of the Civil War was
3.

36 U.S. (II Pet.) 257 (1837).
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based, "even those most constitutionally suspect". And, in the example of examples, Franklin D. Roosevelt created a Court in his
own name. It jettisoned dual federalism, and the bad, old substantive due process of "liberty of contract," and debouched into a new
doctrinal territory of enhanced protection for human (nonproperty)
rights.
It took F.D.R. six years to remake the Supreme Court completely. But it was
the nomination power, and not the Court-packing plan, that did the job. . ..
[W]hen the opportunity to make appointments to the Court does arise, the prospect
for constitutional changes of far-ranging impact should never be underestimated.

Against this background Professor Tribe makes the further important point that the Supreme Court Justices should come to the
bench with ideas about what the Constitution means, and that the
Senators (and the rest of us) are properly concerned with what these
ideas are.
The Supreme Court has room neither for Justices who are afraid to defend
their ideas nor for those who have no ideas. After all, by the time of nomination, a
would-be Justice ought to have opinions and convictions on the full range of topics
of constitutional importance. A blank slate is not the sign of an open mind, but of
an empty one--of immaturity and inexperience, and perhaps even of indifference.

Seeking promises or precise commitments during the confirmation
process is, of course, both offensive and counterproductive-"litmus tests are a poor method of investigating a candidate's substantive constitutional philosophy". But Tribe concludes that "the
range of opinion among judges, scholars, and lawyers on supposedly
settled issues of constitutional law is so broad that outer limits need
to be set considerably short of the absurd." Thus chapter six is
entitled "Policing the Outer Limits," and is divided into sections in
which the Senators are urged to probe "the nominee's vision of
what the Constitution means," and "the nominee's view of the
Supreme Court's role."
All this makes such good sense that this reviewer is emboldened to undertake an experiment-to consider how, on the evidence
of the substantive constitutional arguments presented in this book,
Professor Tribe himself might shape up as a nominee. Is his constitutional vision within the "outer limits"? The stakes are very high,
as Tribe is at pains to remind us, and so the inquiry is not only fair,
it powerfully suggests itself.
There is, first, something curious about many of the particular
cases Professor Tribe chooses to make his general point about the
Supreme Court's recent contributions to the quality of American
civilization. Whatever position one takes on the vexed question of
state regulation of abortions, simple candor requires the recognition
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that Roe v. Wade was a massively controversial decision (second
only, perhaps, to Dred Scott) and that it continues to be so. A dubious contribution to say the least. Or consider Kolender v. Lawson,4
which stripped California police of the power to require identification of suspicious persons on the streets. Does Professor Tribe really suppose that the vast majority of his countrymen regard such
conduct as a grievous intrusion into personal privacy? Does he see
an aggressively asserted anonymity in the fact of reasonable police
inquiry as a contribution to the quality of life in late twentieth
century America? Again and again Tribe's choice of positive outcomes appears perverse in the light of what we can learn of majority
preferences.s
Furthermore, there are some instances in which the treatment
of cases is not as scrupulous as one might wish. Meyer v. Nebraska6
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1 for instance, are presented as examples of the "ultraconservative Court of the early twentieth century"
upholding "rights of free speech and free exercise of religion." As
Philip Kurland demonstrated more than twenty years ago they are
nothing of the kind.s Rather, the opinions by the despised Justice
McReynolds were based squarely on liberty of contract (the bad,
old substantive due process), which Professor Tribe elsewhere
deplores.
But these are quibbles. The genius of the Court is its capacity
to stand against majority sentiment when necessary, and it is likely
that Meyer and Pierce would be decided on different grounds if
heard today. Such things do not place a nominee beyond the "outer
limits." What does, perhaps, is Tribe's conception of the Supreme
Court's role in the American governmental system. Of Roe v.
Wade, Tribe writes that "if the Supreme Court had refused to hear
Roe at all, it would have effectively delegated the fate of mother and
unborn child alike to shifting political majorities in the fifty state
legislatures." The choice of verb is crucial. Certainly the Court's
refusal would have left the question of abortion to the state legislatures. It would have left it there because that is where our historical
constitutional arrangements placed it. To say that the Supreme
Court's refusal to withdraw something from the control of the states
is a "delegation" is tantamount to saying that there are no authori-

u.s.

4.
5.

461

352 (1983).

6.
7.
8.

262 u.s. 390 (1923).
268 u.s. 510 (1925).
P. KURLAND, RELIGION

H.

MCCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE:
BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983).

AND THE LAW

26-31 (1961).

WHAT AMERICANS
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tative decisions about the structure of American government before
the Supreme Court acts.
And, for Tribe, this is only the beginning. Do adults have the
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment? Who makes such
decisions for children or comatose patients? Who should be
deemed competent to choose between life and death for those not
competent to make the decision themselves? Should it be a family
decision? Should it be in the hands of experts-physicians or hospital commitees? We learn that "the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the Constitution's meaning, cannot long avoid these issues."
Professor Tribe does appear ready to allow elected officials to have a
crack at these questions first, but the outcomes there will then be
reviewed by the Court to see if they square with "fundamental
values."
Indeed, Laurence Tribe appears to live in a devouring present
of pressing moral issues where what counts is never who decides but
only whether the decision is the right one. And by this view of the
American system of government, the Court, as guardian of fundamental values, is at the apex of the system, policing the wisdom of
the other, inevitably subordinate, structures. Not only is this a vision that would be unrecognized to the framers of the Constitution,
it would have been unrecognizable to any politically literate American before 1960 or so.
Further, consider Professor Tribe's obscurantist view of our
substantive constitutional heritage. After suggesting that it will be
up to the Supreme Court to act as "playwright and director" of
American politics, deciding "which roles will be played by whom,"
which decisions will be made by government and which by the private sector, which by lawmakers and which by private persons, he
proceeds to announce that "[h]owever decisions like these are to be
made, no conscientious student of the Constitution and its framing
can pretend that more than a few of them have already been made
for us by those who wrote and ratified the Constitution of the
United States." Within the confines of a book review it is not open
to me to explore all the ways in which this statement is misleading.
In fact, a serious student of the Constitution, while never supposing
that any decisions have been "made for us" by the framers, will find
a wealth of relevant guidance on contemporary questions in the history of the framing and subsequent interpretation of the Constitution. The serious student will find himself powerfully moved
toward certain answers while others are forbidden him. What is
important here, is that Tribe makes no serious effort to support his
statement. It is naked assertion. One searches in vain in this book
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for any real address by Professor Tribe to the framing or the
thought of the framers. Indeed, the same thing is true when the
search is expanded to Professor Tribe's scholarly work as represented in Constitutional Choices.
This carelessness toward history and tradition leads us to a final troubling aspect of Laurence Tribe's constitutional vision-his
argument that interpretation of the Constitution is impossible. Intention cannot guide judges in the way Federalist No. 78 insists it
can-not only because the thought of the framers is largely irrelevant to the issues of our time, not only because there are differences
in theme and emphasis within the literature of our framing and constitutional development, but because interpretation is inherently impossible. (Annoyingly, Tribe insists on referring to interpretivism
as "strict constructionism." "Strict constructionism" is either Jefferson's approach to reading the necessary and proper clause, or
Richard Nixon's term for interpretivism. As used by Tribe it is
either mistaken or a low blow.)
Consider the following: "The central flaw of strict constructionism is that words are inherently indeterminate-they can often
be given more than one plausible meaning." The two parts of the
sentence will not keep house together. To say that a word may be
given more than one plausible meaning is not to say that the word is
indeterminate. Words may and do have multiple meanings and nuances. But within the rhetorical conventions of a particular period,
it is often perfectly possible to establish core meanings and demonstrate why plausibility sharply declines as an interpreter attempts to
move away from the core meaning toward strained, peripheral
meanings that may be more congenial to him as policy. The point is
that some ways of reading the Constitution have binding force because they capture accurately what it was that the framers and successor generations were about; they draw legitimacy from the terms
of our basic intergenerational political compact. Other versions of
the same language only pretended to such legitimacy because they
rest on relatively less plausible constructions of the words.
Of course there are always close and arguable cases; but recognizing that is very different from Professor Tribe's pose of studied
agnosticism toward history and toward language. All choices, he is
telling us, are inevitably subjective, and legitimacy is not derived
from who makes the decision and how (the matters to which constitutions are principally addressed). Nor are decisions justified or
necessarily explained in terms of the traditions and the prior agreement of our people (because that is an impossible enterprise).
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Rather they are justified by their being made correctly in reference
to necessarily nebulous "fundamental values."
To Tribe's credit, there is no flinching. In Constitutional
Choices he writes that "I find all legitimating theories not simply
amusing in their pretensions but, in the end, as dangerous as they
are unconvincing."9 Since a Constitution is, at the simplest level, a
set of legitimating procedures embodying a legitimating theory, it
becomes clear that Professor Tribe's quarrel is not really with interpretivists, and not even with the Constitution of the United States,
but with the basic ideas of constitutionalism and majority rule.
What does one make of a distinguished constitutional lawyer
who doubts the possibility of constitutionalism, and whose core
commitment seems to be to a radical subjectivism? Professor Tribe
protests that his position does not amount to "a policy of 'anything
goes'", but he never succeeds in explaining why it does not-indeed, he makes little effort to do so.
One hopes that a conscientious Senator, instructed by this
book and confronted by such a nominee, would vote against
confirmation.

CONSERVATIVES IN COURT. By Lee Epstein.1 Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press. 1985. Pp. xii,
204. $17.95.
Alan B. Morrison 2

I began reading this book with some apprehensions. The
works listed on the back cover as "of related interest" suggested a
substantial possibility of a conservative bias, at least on the publisher's part, and the title page indicated that the book was funded
in part by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, which is known to
be supportive of conservative organizations. I was concerned that
the book would be a paean to the conservative movement and that it
would fail to take a hard look at what was occurring in these organizations. I was nonetheless hopeful that it would provide substantial new data about these organizations-how they operate, what
they are doing, how they are financed, and how their success can be
measured by some objective standard.
9. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 6 (1985).
I. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Methodist University.
2. Mr. Morrison is the Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington,
D.C., which Ms. Epstein refers to as a "liberal" organization.

